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Abstract
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching
markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various
solution concepts in trading networks—multi-sided matching markets with bilateral
contracts—under the assumption of full substitutability of agents’ preferences. It is
known that outcomes that satisfy trail stability always exist and can be found in linear
time. Here we consider a slightly stronger solution concept in which agents can simul-
taneously offer an upstream and a downstream contract. We show that deciding the
existence of outcomes satisfying this solution concept is an NP-complete problem even
in a special (flow network) case of our model. It follows that the existence of stable
outcomes—immune to deviations by arbitrary sets of agents—is also an NP-hard prob-
lem in trading networks (and in flow networks). Finally, we show that even verifying
whether a given outcome is stable is NP-complete in trading networks.
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1 Introduction
One of the most important features of the marriage market or the college admissions
problems is that (pairwise) stable outcomes can always be found efficiently using the cele-
brated Deferred Acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962). Efficient computation is
key for practical applications of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm and its variants (Roth,
1984, Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 2003, Sönmez and Switzer, 2013, Hatfield and Kominers,
2014). Moreover, since in standard (one-to-one) marriage markets or (many-to-one) college
admissions problems (pairwise) stable outcomes coincide with the core, there is no obvious
need to select among various solution concepts.
However, in more complex, many-to-many matching markets there are many different,
yet economically natural and interpretable, solution concepts (Blair, 1988, Sotomayor, 1999,
Echenique and Oviedo, 2006, Klaus and Walzl, 2009). For example, pairwise stable outcomes
do not coincide with the core (Blair, 1988). What makes a good solution concept? At the
very least, it should make falsifiable predictions. But in economics good solution concepts
often derive their appeal for normative reasons: they have sensible properties and make
intuitive sense in particular settings. Efficient computation can serve as one such desirable
property. As Papadimitriou (2007, pp. 29-30) argues:
The reason is simple: If an equilibrium concept is not efficiently computable,
much of its credibility as a prediction of the behavior of rational agents is lost
– after all, there is no clear reason why a group of agents cannot be simulated
by a machine. Efficient computability is an important modelling prerequisite for
solution concepts.
If agents cannot efficiently find certain deviations from an outcome in a matching market,
then a stability concept that is based on these deviations may be too strong. On the other
hand, if it is computationally hard to verify whether an outcome satisfying a particular
solution concept exists then this limits the applicability of this solution concept for matching
market design.
In this paper, we consider the computational complexity of various solution concepts in
trading networks. A trading network is a matching market in which heterogeneous firms can
sign many contracts that specify the terms of the trade, quality of the product, price etc. with
their suppliers (upstream) and with their buyers (downstream). Following a seminal contri-
bution by Ostrovsky (2008), we assume that agents’ preferences satisfy full substitutability,
that is, upstream and downstream contracts are complements, but contracts on the same
side are substitutes. Our model can capture not only wealth effects, but also distortionary
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frictions, such as sales taxes or bargaining costs (Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytel-
boym, 2017). Finding a solution concept with attractive computational as well as economic
properties would allow trading networks to be deployed in a variety of empirical (Fox, 2017)
and practical applications (Morstyn et al., 2018).
In our model, stable outcomes, i.e., those immune to arbitrary blocks by sets of firms, do
not necessarily exist (Hatfield and Kominers, 2012).1 Following Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and
Teytelboym (2016), we first point out that outcomes satisfying trail stability, an extension
of pairwise or chain stability (Ostrovsky, 2008), always exist and can be found in linear
time (in the number of contracts) by an extension of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm
(Theorem 1). Trail-stable outcomes are immune to locally blocking trails (sequences of
distinct contracts in which a buyer of one contract is the seller in the next). In a locally
blocking trail, agents simultaneously accept pairs of upstream and downstream contracts
along the trail but there must also be agents that “kick off” (and “complete”) the blocking
trail by unilaterally offering (or “accepting”) a single downstream (or a single upstream)
contract. Trail stability is an attractive solution concept: in a variant of our model with
continuous prices and distortionary frictions, trail-stable outcomes essentially coincide with
competitive equilibrium outcomes (Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym, 2017).
We then relax the requirement of locally blocking trails that agents can only make an
upstream (downstream) offer following the receipt of a downstream (upstream) offer. Thus
we allow agents to offer an upstream and a downstream contract simultaneously, forming
blocking cycles. As a result, we consider the existence of path-or-cycle-stable outcomes which
are immune to blocking sets in the form of paths (trails in which every agent is distinct) or
cycles.2 Path-or-cycle-stable outcomes do not always exist in trading networks. We show
that the decision problem of whether a path-or-cycle-stable outcome exists is NP-complete
even in a flow network (Fleiner, 2014), which is a special case of a trading network (Theo-
rem 2).3 The proof reduces the problem to the problem of partitioning a directed graph into
two acyclic sets, which is known to be NP-complete (Bokal et al., 2004). Since trading net-
works are more general than flow networks, it follows that the problem of deciding whether
a path-or-cycle-stable outcome exists in a trading network is also NP-hard. Therefore, the
ability to coordinate upstream and downstream contract offers minimally renders the com-
1Stable outcomes exist in supply chains in which no firm can be simultaneously upstream and down-
stream from another (Ostrovsky, 2008, Westkamp, 2010, Hatfield and Kominers, 2012). Stable outcomes
also exist (and coincide with competitive equilibria) in a variant of our model with continuous prices and no
distortionary frictions (Hatfield et al., 2013, Fleiner et al., 2017).
2We do not suggest that path-or-cycle stability has an intuitive economic interpretation. We use this
solution concept to give the strongest computational complexity result possible and to reveal the structure
of stable outcomes in flow networks.
3Garey and Johnson (1979) provide definitions of computational complexity classes used in this paper.
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putational problem for existence intractable. Our result superficially resembles the problems
of determining the existence of pairwise stable outcomes in two-sided hospital-resident mar-
kets with couples (McDermid and Manlove, 2010), with sizes (Delacrétaz, 2019), or with
multidimensional constraints (Delacrétaz et al., 2016): in these models, as in ours, finding
stable outcomes is hard due to the presence of various constraints. However, as far we know,
none of our results has appeared elsewhere in the literature.
Finally, we turn our attention to stable outcomes analyzed in the context of trading
networks by Hatfield et al. (2015). While stable outcomes do not always exist in trading
networks, Hatfield et al. (2015) show that in trading networks blocking sets can be decom-
posed into certain blocking trails (under a monotonicity condition). We first show that in
flow networks stable outcomes coincide with path-or-cycle-stable outcomes (Theorem 3).
It follows that deciding whether a stable outcome exists in a flow network is NP-complete
(Corollary 1). Finally, we show that even verifying that a particular outcome is (not) stable
is NP-complete (Theorem 4). The proof provides a reduction from the set partition problem,
which is known to be (weakly) NP-complete.
Section 2 introduces the full model of trading networks and the special case of flow
networks (2.3). In Section 3, we introduce trail stability (3.1), path-or-cycle stability (3.2),
and stability (3.3), and state the main results about the computational complexity of finding
outcomes that satisfy these solution concepts. Section 4 leaves an open question concerning
another solution concept—weak trail stability—introduced by Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and
Teytelboym (2016). Section 5 is a conclusion.
2 Model
Our notation follows Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016).
2.1 Ingredients
In a trading network, there is finite set of agents (firms or consumers) F and a finite set
of contracts X. A contract x ∈ X is a bilateral agreement between a buyer b(x) ∈ F and
a seller s(x) ∈ F . Hence, F (x) := {s(x), b(x)} is the set of firms associated with contract
x and, more generally, F (Y ) is the set of firms associated with contract set Y ⊆ X. Call
XBf := {x ∈ X | b(x) = f} and XSf := {x ∈ X | s(x) = f} the sets of f ’s upstream and
downstream contracts – for which f is a buyer and a seller, respectively. Clearly, Y Bf and
Y Sf form a partition over the set of contracts Y f := {y ∈ Y | f ∈ F (y)} which involve f ,
since an agent cannot be a buyer and a seller in the same contract. A firm f is a terminal
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seller if there are no upstream contracts for f in the network and f is a terminal buyer if
the network does not contain any downstream contracts for f . An agent who is either a
terminal buyer or a terminal seller is called a terminal agent. In an acyclic trading network,
no agent simultaneously buys and sells from another agent, even via intermediaries.
Every firm has a choice function Cf , such that Cf (Yf ) ⊆ Yf for any Yf ⊆ Xf .4 We say
that choice functions of f ∈ F satisfy the irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) condition
if for any Y ⊆ X and Cf (Y ) ⊆ Z ⊆ Y we have that Cf (Z) = Cf (Y ) (Blair, 1988, Alkan,
2002, Fleiner, 2003, Echenique, 2007, Aygün and Sönmez, 2013).
For any Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ X, define the chosen set of upstream contracts
CfB(Y |Z) := Cf (Y Bf ∪ ZSf ) ∩XBf (2.1)
which is the set of contracts f chooses as a buyer when f has access to upstream contracts
Y and downstream contracts Z. Analogously, define the chosen set of downstream contracts
CfS(Z|Y ) := Cf (ZSf ∪ Y Bf ) ∩XSf (2.2)
For brevity, we will also use Cf (Y |Z) := (CfB(Y |Z)|CfS(Z|Y )), so Cf (Y |Z) = (Y ′|Z ′) means
that if f is offered upstream and downstream contracts Y and Z, respectively, then Y ′ and
Z ′ are those among them that f chooses (with Y ′ ⊆ Y and Z ′ ⊆ Z). We also define the
rejected sets of contracts RfB(Y |Z) := Yf \ CfB(Y |Z) and RfS(Z|Y ) := Zf \ CfS(Z|Y ). An
outcome A ⊆ X is a set of contracts.
A set of contracts A ⊆ X is individually rational for an agent f ∈ F if Cf (Af ) = Af . We
call set A acceptable if A is individually rational for all agents f ∈ F . For sets of contracts
W,A ⊆ X, we say that A is (W, f)-acceptable if Af ⊆ Cf (Wf ∪ Af ), i.e., if the agent f
chooses all contracts from set Af whenever she is offered A alongside W . Set of contracts A
is W -acceptable if A is (W, f)-acceptable for all agents f ∈ F . Note that contract set A is
individually rational for agent f if and only if it is (∅, f)-acceptable.
2.2 Assumptions on choice functions
We can now state our key assumption on choice functions introduced by Ostrovsky (2008).
Definition 1. Choice functions of f ∈ F are fully substitutable if for all Y ′ ⊆ Y ⊆ X and
Z ′ ⊆ Z ⊆ X they are:
4Since firms only care about their own contracts, we can write Cf (Y ) to mean Cf (Yf ).
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1. Same-side substitutable (SSS):
(a) RfB(Y
′|Z) ⊆ RfB(Y |Z)
(b) RfS(Z
′|Y ) ⊆ RfS(Z|Y )
2. Cross-side complementary (CSC):
(a) RfB(Y |Z) ⊆ RfB(Y |Z ′)
(b) RfS(Z|Y ) ⊆ RfS(Z|Y ′)
Contracts are stitutable if every firm regards any of its upstream or any of its downstream
contracts as substitutes, but its upstream and downstream contracts as complements. Hence,
rejected downstream (upstream) contracts continue to be rejected whenever the set of of-
fered downstream (upstream) contracts expands or whenever the set of offered upstream
(downstream) contracts shrinks.
2.3 Special case: flow networks and flow-based choice functions
We first define flow-based choice functions.
Definition 2. Cf is flow-based if
• whenever f ∈ F is a terminal agent, Cf (Yf ) = Yf for any Y ⊆ X;
• whenever f ∈ F is not a terminal agent
– f has linear-order preferences Bf over XBf and linear-order preferences Sf over
XSf , and
– given access to upstream contracts Y ⊆ XBf and downstream contracts Z ⊆ XSf ,
a firm f with flow-based choice function will choose its k most preferred upstream
contracts from Y according to Bf and k most preferred downstream contracts
from Z according to Sf where k := min{|Y |, |Z|}.
Since non-terminal agents with flow-based choice functions always pick the same num-
ber of upstream and downstream contracts, their preferences satisfy the so-called Kirchhoff
equality.5 It is immediate that flow-based choice functions defined in this way are fully
substitutable and satisfy IRC.
A flow network is a trading network in which there are exactly two terminal agents
(and the remaining firms are non-terminal) and all choice functions are flow-based (Fleiner,
2014).6
5Flow-based choice functions are a special case of “separable” choice functions (Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura,
and Teytelboym, 2016).
6In fact, what follows is a simplification of Fleiner’s flow network model where all capacities have value 1
and flow values must be integral.
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3 Solution concepts and their computational complexity
3.1 Trail stability
In order to explain our first solution concept, we first define a trail.
Definition 3. A non-empty set of contracts T is a trail if its elements can be arranged in
some order (x1, . . . , xM) such that b(xm) = s(xm+1) holds for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1} where
M = |T |.
The following solution concept was introduced by Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytel-
boym (2016).
Definition 4. An outcome A ⊆ X is trail-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no trail T = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, such that T ∩ A = ∅ and
(a) {x1} is (A, f1)-acceptable for f1 = s(x1), and
(b) {xm−1, xm} is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤M
and
(c) {xM} is (A, fM+1)-acceptable for fM+1 = b(xM).
The above trail T is called a locally blocking trail to A.
Trail stability is a natural solution concept when firms interact mainly with their buyers
and suppliers and deviations by arbitrary sets of firms are difficult to arrange. In a trail-stable
outcome, no agent wants to drop his contracts and there exists no sequence of consecutive
bilateral contracts comprising a trail such that any intermediate agent who is offered a
downstream (upstream) contract along the trail wants to choose it alongside the subsequent
upstream (downstream) contract in the trail. Importantly, we require that the first (final)
agent wants to unilaterally offer (accept) the first (final) contract in the trail.7 For trail
stability, we do not require that intermediate agents accept all the contracts along the locally
blocking trail. Instead they are simply required to myopically accept pairs of upstream and
downstream contracts as they appear along the trail. We strengthen this requirement in
Section 4.
Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016) proved that under full substitutability
trail-stable outcomes always exist in trading networks and, under certain conditions, have
7The trail and the order of conditional acceptances can, of course, be reversed with fM+1 offering the
first upstream contract to seller fM and so on.
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a familiar lattice structure. Trail-stable outcomes may not be Pareto-efficient. In a variant
of our model with continuous prices, Fleiner, Jagadeesan, Jankó, and Teytelboym (2017)
showed that whenever there are distortionary frictions, such as sales taxes, in the economy,
trail-stable outcomes essentially coincide with competitive equilibrium outcomes.8 Here we
focus on the computational properties of trail-stable outcomes.
Theorem 1 (Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym, 2016). Suppose that in a trading
network choice functions satisfy full substitutability and IRC. Then a trail-stable outcome
exists and can be found in time linear in the number of contracts.
The proof of Theorem 1 follows immediately from the proof of existence of trail-stable
outcomes provided by Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016) and Adachi (2017).
Trail-stable outcomes are found by a generalized Gale-Shapley algorithm defined in Fleiner,
Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016). In the generalized Gale-Shapley algorithm, at least
one contract is rejected at each step and since the number of contracts is finite, the number
of steps required to find a trail-stable outcome is bounded by the number of contracts.
3.2 Path-or-cycle stability
The definition of trail stability requires that there be initial and final agents that would
unconditionally offer or accept an upstream or a downstream contract while all the interme-
diaries only make a downstream (upstream) offer after receiving an upstream (downstream)
offer. Let us now relax this condition and allow agents to form blocking cycles: now every
agent can offer an upstream at a downstream contract simultaneously without having to
accept them individually. This is a mild strengthening of trail stability (whenever there is
at most one contract between agents) that treats the initial and the terminal agents in the
blocking trail in the same way as the intermediate agents in the blocking trail and allows for
minimal additional coordination among blocking agents.
For the sake of further simplicity, let us only focus on paths, i.e., trails in which all agents
are distinct.
Definition 5. A non-empty set of contracts P (|P | = M) is a path if its elements can be
arranged in some order (x1, . . . , xM) such that
• b(xm) = s(xm+1) holds for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1}, and
• all firms s(x1), s(x2), . . . , s(xM), and b(xM) are distinct.
Now, a path that “returns” to its origin agent is a cycle.
8The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem can, of course, fail in the presence of distortionary frictions.
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Definition 6. A non-empty set of contracts C (|C| = M) is a cycle if its elements can be
arranged in some order (x1, . . . , xM) such that
• b(xm) = s(xm+1) holds for all m ∈ {1, . . . ,M − 1},
• all firms s(x1), s(x2), . . . , s(xM), and b(xM) are distinct, and
• b(xM) = s(x1).
Cycles are therefore also trails.
Definition 7. An outcome A ⊆ X is path-or-cycle-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
2. There is no path or cycle B such that B ∩ A = ∅ and B is (A, f)-acceptable for each
f ∈ F (B).
Such paths or cycles are called blocking paths and blocking cycles.9
An interesting property of flow-based choice functions is that given an outcome A ⊆ X,
any cycle C disjoint from A is a blocking cycle, as any firm which is offered a pair of additional
upstream and downstream contracts will accept them. We will use this property to prove
our second key result.
Theorem 2. It is NP-complete to decide if a flow network admits a path-or-cycle-stable
outcome.
Proof. The problem is in NP, since given an outcome A, we can check in linear time (with
respect to the number of contracts) whether it admits a blocking path or a cycle: we only
have to check that the contracts X \ A do not contain a cycle or a path starting with an
(A, ·)-acceptable contract and ending with an (A, ·)-acceptable contract; both these tasks
can be decided using, e.g., some variant of the depth-first search (DFS) algorithm on the
directed graph representing X \ A.
To prove NP-hardness, we present a polynomial reduction from the following problem:
given a directed graph D, decide whether it is possible to partition the vertices of D into
two acyclic sets V1 and V2. Here, a set U of vertices is acyclic, if there is no directed cycle
in D[U ]. This problem was proved to be NP-complete by Bokal et al. (2004).
Given our input D = (V,E), we construct a set X of contracts and a set F of firms
with flow-based choice functions (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). There will be at most
one upstream and at most one downstream contracts between any two firms, so we will
9Note that path-or-cycle stability is weaker than chain stability in the sense of Hatfield et al. (2015).
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Figure 1: Illustration of two node gadgets, Du and Dv, and the two contracts in Z connecting
them; the figure assumes uv ∈ E. The number on some contract x written next to some
firm indicates the rank of the contract x in the preference ordering of the given firm.
denote a contract x with s(x) = f1 and b(x) = f2 as f1f2. First, we introduce a node
gadget Dv for each v ∈ V ; the set of firms in Dv is {sv, av, a′v, bv, b′v, tv} and the set of
contracts in DV is {svav, svbv, ava′v, bvb′v, a′vtv, b′vtv}. Next, we add terminal firms s and t,
together with the contracts ssv and tvt for each v ∈ V . Finally, we add the contract set
Z = {a′uav, b′ubv | uv ∈ E}.
Instead of describing the full preferences of each firm over its upstream and downstream
contracts, we only define a partial ordering (and assume that the preferences of each firm
respect this partial order). Namely, for each v ∈ V , we let sv prefer svav to svbv, and we let
tv prefer b′vtv to a′vtv. In Fig. 1, we indicate the rankings of the contracts with numbers 1
(highest rank), 2 (second highest) etc. Additionally, we let any firm in {av, a′v, bv, b′v} prefer
all contracts not in Z to contracts in Z.
We claim that there exists an outcome inX admitting neither blocking paths nor blocking
cycles if and only if the vertices of D can be partitioned into two acyclic sets.
“⇒”: Let us suppose that there exists an outcome A ⊆ X that does not admit any
blocking paths or cycles.
We show that Z ∩A = ∅. To see this, first consider a contract a′uav ∈ Z, and suppose for
contradiction that a′uav ∈ A. Since av has only one downstream contract ava′v, this means
that the contract svav cannot be contained in A (because of the Kirchhoff equality for av).
Note also that svav is (A, av)-acceptable, because it is a contract preferred by av to a′uav.
Consider the path P from s through sv to av. Clearly, if neither contract on P is in A, then
it is a blocking path, otherwise the contract svav is (A, sv)-acceptable and hence a blocking
path itself, a contradiction. So suppose now b′ubv ∈ A. Arguing analogously as before, we can
prove that either the path from b′u through tu to t, or simply the contract b′utu is blocking.
Thus we obtain that A cannot contain any contracts from Z, and only contains contracts
within node gadgets and contracts where the seller or the buyer is the terminal agent s or
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the terminal agent t, respectively.
Therefore, we know that for each v ∈ V , at most one of the contracts ava′v and bvb′v
can be contained in A (since sv can choose at most one of its downstream contracts by the
Kirchhoff equality). Let Q = {v ∈ V | ava′v /∈ A}, and let R = V \ Q; clearly bvb′v /∈ A for
any v ∈ R. It is not hard to see that both Q and R are acyclic. Indeed, any cycle within
vertices of Q in D corresponds to a cycle using only contracts of Z and the contracts ava′v,
v ∈ Q, and such a cycle cannot exists as it would block A. The same argument works to
show the acyclicity of R, proving the first direction of our reduction.
“⇐”: Assume now that Q and R are two acyclic subsets of V forming a partition. We
define an outcome A ⊆ X that contains the contracts ssv, svbv, bvb′v, b′vtv, and tvt for each
v ∈ Q, and similarly, the contracts ssv, svav, ava′v, a′vtv, and tvt for each v ∈ R. We claim
that there is no blocking path or cycle for A.
To see this, observe that by the Kirchhoff equality a contract that is (A, ·)-acceptable in
itself for some firm (but is not contained in A) must be either suau for some u ∈ Q or b′vtv for
some v ∈ R. Since there is no path starting with a contract suau and ending with a contract
b′vtv, we know that no path can block A.
To show that A admits no blocking cycles, we simply use that blocking cycles must be
disjoint from A. Note that any cycle has to use at least one contract of Z, as node gadgets
are acyclic. We partition the contracts in Z into four sets as follows; recall that A ∩ Z = ∅.
Let ZQ,R denote those contracts in Z that leave a node gadget Du with u ∈ Q and arrive at
a node gadget Dv with v ∈ R; we define ZR,Q, ZQ,Q, and ZR,R analogously. To see that no
contract xy ∈ ZQ,R ∪ZR,Q can be part of a blocking cycle for A, note that A contains either
the unique upstream contract of x or the unique downstream contract of y, by the definition
of A. In either case, any cycle that contains the contract xy must also contain a contract in
A, and hence cannot be a blocking cycle.
By the same reasoning, no contract b′ubv for some u, v ∈ Q can be contained in a blocking
cycle, since both the unique upstream contract of b′u and the unique downstream contract
of bv are contained in A. Therefore, any contract of ZQ,Q used by a blocking cycle must be
of the form a′uav for some u, v ∈ Q. Similarly, any contract of ZR,R used by a blocking cycle
must be of the form b′ubv for some u, v ∈ R. By the structure of the network, this implies
that no cycle can use contracts both from ZQ,Q and from ZR,R. However, any blocking
cycle that uses only contracts in ZQ,Q and contracts of the form aua′u with u ∈ Q directly
corresponds to a cycle within D[Q]. Similarly, any blocking cycle using only contracts in
ZR,R and contracts of the form bub′u with u ∈ R yields a cycle within D[R]. Therefore, the
acyclicity of Q and R ensures that A admits no blocking cycle, proving the correctness of
our reduction.
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If we translate Theorem 2 into the language of stable flows introduced by Fleiner (2014),
we obtain that it is NP-complete to decide whether a completely stable flow exists in a given
network with preferences, where a flow is completely stable if it admits neither blocking
paths nor blocking cycles. In fact, our statement holds not only in the discrete case (as
implied directly by Theorem 2), but also in the continuous case where the flow can take real
values as well; adjusting the proof of Theorem 2 to this case is straightforward. Hence we
settle a conjecture posed by Fleiner (2014).
3.3 Stability
We now relax the assumption the blocking sets must be paths or cycles and consider
general set blocks in trading networks (Hatfield et al., 2015) and flow networks (Fleiner,
2014).
Definition 8. An outcome A ⊆ X is stable if:
1. A is acceptable.
2. There exist no non-empty set of contracts Z ⊆ X, such that Z ∩ A = ∅ and Z is
(A, f)-acceptable for all f ∈ F (Z); such sets are called blocking.
Stable outcomes are immune to deviations by arbitrary groups of firms, which can re-
contract freely among themselves while keeping any of their existing contracts. Stable out-
comes always exist in acyclic networks if choice functions are fully substitutable. However,
Fleiner (2014) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012) showed that stable outcomes may not exist
in general trading networks.
3.3.1 Stability in flow networks
We next prove that in flow networks path-or-cycle-stable outcomes coincide with stable
outcomes.
Theorem 3. In a flow network an outcome is path-or-cycle-stable if and only if it is stable.
Proof. Let X be a set of firms in a flow network. Using the definitions, it is immediate that
a stable outcome A is also path-or-cycle-stable, as a blocking path or cycle is naturally a
blocking set as well.
For the opposite direction, assume that A is a path-or-cycle-stable outcome. Towards
contradiction, let us also assume that B ⊆ X is a blocking set for A. Suppose first that B
contains a cycle BC . Then BC is disjoint from A because BC ⊆ B ⊆ X \A. Moreover, BC is
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(A, f)-acceptable for any firm f : if f is a terminal then it accepts all contracts offered, and
if f is non-terminal then, by the Kirchhoff equality, it accepts BC alongside with A since BCf
is either empty or it contains an upstream and a downstream contract for f . Hence, BC is
a blocking cycle for A. This proves that B cannot contain any cycles. Let us now consider
a path P = (x1, . . . , xp) in B that is maximal (in the sense that no contracts can be added
to P to obtain a longer path). By the acyclicity of B, s := s(x1) must be a firm with no
upstream contracts in B, and t := b(xp) must be a firm with no downstream contracts in B.
Since B is blocking for A, we know that B is (A, s)-acceptable. Recall that s has a flow-
based choice function. Therefore either s is a terminal firm (always accepting every offered
contract), or s must obey the Kirchhoff inequality, and therefore can accept the downstream
contract x1 ∈ XSs ∩ B only if there is a less preferred downstream contract in A. Note that
this means that the contract x1 is (A, s(x1))-acceptable. Using the fact that B is (A, t)-
acceptable, we can argue analogously to show that the contract xp is (A, b(xp))-acceptable.
Finally, consider any intermediary firm f lying on path P ; assume that f = b(xi) = s(xi+1)
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , p − 1}. Again, either f is terminal (and thus accepts all offers) or it
is non-terminal and obeys the Kirchhoff equality. In the latter case, the path P is (A, f)-
acceptable because it contains exactly one upstream contract and one downstream contract
for f , namely xi and xi+1. Hence we get that P is a blocking path for A, a contradiction.
Theorems 2 and 3 imply that deciding whether a stable outcome exists in a flow network
is NP-complete.
Corollary 1. It is NP-complete to decide if a flow network admits a stable outcome.
3.3.2 Stability in trading networks
We finally turn to the existence of stable outcomes in trading networks which was first
considered by Hatfield et al. (2015). They showed that (under certain conditions) stable
outcomes are equivalent to outcomes that are immune to blocks along trails in which every
firm can simultaneously offer and accept all its contracts in the trail. However, it is easy to
see that in general trading networks path-or-cycle stability does not imply stability. But since
flow networks are a special case of the trading networks that we consider in our general model
(because flow-based choice functions are fully substitutable and satisfy IRC), Corollary 1
implies that deciding whether a stable outcome exists is NP-hard also in our trading networks
model.
Corollary 2. Suppose that in a trading network choice functions satisfy full substitutability
and IRC. Then it is NP-hard to decide if the trading network admits a stable outcome.
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In fact, dealing with stable outcomes is even trickier in trading networks. Our last result
demonstrates that even verifying whether an outcome is stable is computationally intractable
in general trading networks.10
Let Instability be the following decision problem. An instance of Instability is a
trading network with set of contracts X and a set of agents F (with choice functions that
satisfy full substitutability and IRC) and an outcome A ⊆ X. The answer for an instance
of Instability is YES if the particular outcome A is not stable (that is, if there is a set of
contracts Z that blocks A), otherwise the answer is NO.
Theorem 4. The Instability problem is NP-complete. Moreover, if choice functions are
represented by oracles, then finding the right answer for an instance of Instability might
require an exponential number of oracle calls.
Proof of Theorem 4. The Instability problem clearly belongs to complexity class NP, as
verifying that a given set Z of contracts is a blocking set for an outcome A requires polynomial
time.
To show that Instability is NP-hard we reduce the NP-complete Partition prob-
lem to Instability. An instance of the Partition problem is given by a k-tuple Π =
(a1, a2, . . . , ak) of positive integers such that a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . ≤ ak holds. The answer to this
problem is YES if and only if there is a subset I of {1, 2, . . . , k} such that∑i∈I ai = s where
2s =
∑k
i=1 ai. Given our instance Π of Partition, we define an instance of Instability
as follows. First, construct a trading network with firms f and g and with contracts y and
xi such that f = s(y) = b(xi) and g = b(y) = s(xi) for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Next, define choice
function CfΠ with the help of s =
1
2
∑k
i=1 ai by
CfΠ(X|Y ) =
{
(X|Y ) if ∑{ai : xi ∈ X} ≥ s,
(X|∅) if ∑{ai : xi ∈ X} < s.
It is straightforward to check that CfΠ satisfies IRC, so let us check whether it is fully
satisfiable as well. First, since f always accepts all upstream contracts, both SSS and CSC
clearly hold for f as a buyer (that is, conditions 1(a) and 2(a) are satisfied in Definition 1).
To check same-side substitutability as a seller for f , let us consider a fixed set X of upstream
contracts offered for f . Then f either accepts all downstream contracts (in caseX is such that∑{ai : xi ∈ X} ≥ s) or it rejects every downstream contract (otherwise); in either case, the
set of contracts rejected by f as a seller satisfies SSS (that is, condition 1(b) in Definition 1).
To check cross-side complementarity as a seller for f (condition 2(b) in Definition 1), note
10The proof of Theorem 2 shows that in flow networks verifying whether an outcome is stable can be done
in time linear in the number of contracts.
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that if f rejects the contract y, then it must be the case that
∑{ai : xi ∈ X} < s for the
offered set X of upstream contracts. But then f will reject y for any subset X ′ ⊆ X too, so
CSC follows as well. Hence, CfΠ is fully substitutable.
Next, define CgΠ as follows:
CgΠ(Y |X) =

(∅|∅) if Y = ∅,
(Y |X) if Y = {y} and ∑{ai : xi ∈ X} ≤ s,
(Y |X ∩ {x1, x2, . . . , xt}) if Y = {y} and t is such that∑{ai : xi ∈ X, i ≤ t} ≤ s <∑{ai : xi ∈ X, i ≤ t+ 1}.
One can readily check that CgΠ also satisfies IRC. To see that it is also fully substitutable,
first notice that g never rejects any upstream contracts, so it satisfies both SSS and CSC with
g as a buyer. To check the requirements for SSS with g taking the role of a seller, let us fix
a set Y of upstream contracts. If Y = ∅, then g rejects all downstream contracts. Otherwise
(that is, if Y = {y}), suppose that g rejects some xj from a set X of offered downstream
contracts. This means that there exists an index t < j such that
∑{ai : xi ∈ X, i ≤ t} ≤ s <∑{ai : xi ∈ X, i < t+1}. But then, for any superset X ′ ⊇ X of dowstream contracts offered
to g, the same condition will hold for some t′ ≤ t < j, and thus xj will again be rejected.
This proves SSS with g being a seller. To verify that CgΠ is also cross-side complementary
with g as a seller, it suffices to observe that any downstream contract rejected while Y = {y}
is offered to g will get rejected again when Y ′ = ∅ is offered to g. Hence, we get that CgΠ is
fully substitutable.
So far, based on our instance Π of Partition, we have determined a trading network.
To finish the construction of our Instability instance, we set an outcome A = ∅. We have
to show that the answer to our instance of the Partition problem is YES if and only if
A = ∅ is not stable.
Assume now that the answer to our instance Π of Partition is YES, that is,
∑
i∈I ai = s
for some I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}. Define XI := {xi : i ∈ I} and Y = {y}. By the above definitions,
CfΠ(X|Y ) = (X|Y ) and CgΠ(Y |X) = (Y |X), hence X ∪ Y blocks A = ∅, so A is not stable.
Assume now that A = ∅ is not stable. This means that there is a blocking set Z to
A and define I = {i : xi ∈ Z}, XI := {xi : xi ∈ Z} and Y := Z ∩ {y}. As Z is
blocking, we have CfΠ(XI |Y ) = (XI |Y ) and CgΠ(Y |XI) = (Y |XI). If Y = ∅ then (Y |XI) =
CgΠ(Y |XI) = CgΠ(∅|XI) = (∅, ∅), so Z = XI ∪ Y = ∅ ∪ ∅ = ∅, and hence Z is not blocking.
Otherwise, Y = {y}, and from CgΠ(Y |XI) = (Y |XI) we get that
∑
i∈I ai ≤ s. Moreover,
from y ∈ CfΠ(XI , Y ) we get that
∑
i∈I ai ≥ s. Consequently
∑
i∈I ai = s, and the answer to
the Partition problem is YES.
To prove the second part of the theorem, define a trading network with firms f and g and
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with contracts y and xi such that f = s(y) = b(xi) and g = b(y) = s(xi) for for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n.
Define the following choice function
Cf0 (X|Y ) =
{
(X|Y ) if |X| ≥ n + 1
(X|∅) if |X| ≤ n (3.1)
For I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} define XI := {xi : i ∈ I}. For |I| = n let
CfI (X|Y ) =
{
(X|Y ) if |X| ≥ n + 1 or if X = XI
(X|∅) if |X| ≤ n and X 6= XI
It is straightforward to check that choice functions Cf0 and C
f
I above satisfy the full substi-
tutability condition and IRC. Define the following choice function for g
Cg(Y |X) =

(∅|∅) if Y = ∅
(Y |X) if Y = {y} and |X| ≤ n
(Y |X ∩ {x1, x2, . . . , xt}) if Y = {y} and |{xi ∈ X : i ≤ t}| = n
(3.2)
As Cg = CgΠ for Π = (1, 1, . . . , 1), C
g also satisfies the full substitutability condition and
IRC.
Now assume that an instance of Instability is given by the above network and an
outcome A = ∅. Assume that the choice functions are not given explicitly, but by value-
returning oracles. Moreover, we know exactly that the choice function of g is the one defined
in (3.2) and we know that the choice function of f is either Cf0 or C
f
I for some I. It is easy
to check that A is not stable if and only if Cf = CfI and in this case the only blocking set
is Z = Xi ∪ {y}. So if one has to decide stability of A, then one must determine the Cf (Z)
values for all such possible Z, and this means
(
2n
n
)
oracle calls.
4 Open question
Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016) introduce another solution concept,
called weak trail stability. Let us consider a trail T = {x1, ..., xM} whose elements are
arranged in a sequence (x1, ..., xM) and define T≤mf = {x1, ..., xm}∩Tf to be firm f ’s contracts
out of the first m contracts in the trail and T≥mf = {xm, ..., xM}∩Tf to be firm f ’s contracts
out of the last M −m + 1 contracts in the trail (where m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}).
Definition 9. An outcome A ⊆ X is weakly trail-stable if
1. A is acceptable.
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2. There is no trail T = {x1, x2, . . . , xM}, such that T ∩ A = ∅ and
(a) {x1} is (A, f1)-acceptable for f1 = s(x1) and
(b) At least one of the following two options holds:
i. T≤mfm is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤ M ,
or
ii. T≥m−1fm is (A, fm)-acceptable for fm = b(xm−1) = s(xm) whenever 1 < m ≤M
(c) {xM} is (A, fM+1)-acceptable for fM+1 = b(xM).
The above trail T is called a sequentially blocking trail to A.
Like trail stability, weak trail stability also has an intuitive economic interpretation. But
note that as the sequentially blocking trail grows, we ensure that each intermediate agent
wants to choose all his contracts along the sequentially blocking trail. We did not impose
this requirement for trail stability. As Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016)
argue weak trail stability might be a good solution concept in markets where contracts are
not executed quickly. Fleiner, Jankó, Tamura, and Teytelboym (2016) also show that weak
trail stability is a weaker solution concept than trail stability in trading networks under full
substitutability (though not in general). However, unlike trail-stable outcomes, the set of
weakly trail-stable outcomes does not appear to have a structure that allows for efficient
computation.
Conjecture 1. Suppose that in a trading network choice functions satisfy full substitutabil-
ity and IRC. Then it is NP-complete to decide whether there exists a weakly trail-stable
outcome that is not trail-stable.
5 Conclusion
We showed that stable outcomes, which are immune to deviation by groups of agents and
which can be efficiently computed in two-sided matching markets or in supply chains, can-
not be efficiently verified or computed in trading networks. Our main result is particularly
strong: even in flow networks, outcomes that are immune to blocks in which even two agents
can coordinate on an upstream and downstream contract cannot be computed efficiently. We
suggest an alternative solution concept—trail stability—which, under full substitutability,
always exists, has an intuitive economic interpretation, coincides with competitive equilib-
rium in model with prices, and can be efficiently found in general trading networks. Further
work can examine the computation properties of similar stability notions in trading networks
where agents have more complex preferences (Jagadeesan, 2017).
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